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The Supreme Court in LaSalle acknowledged an 
exception to the “Absolute Priority Rule” for “new value 
contributions” on condition of a “market test”. This study 
examined the impact of the “market test” on share price 
reactions with regard to Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in 
the United States. This study found that the share price 
reactions were stronger for the period after LaSalle. 
However, the effect of the “market test”, determined by 
my model, was not statistical significant. The results 
suggests that future research on the “market test” should 
use a channel which is more directly linked to “absolute 
priority deviations”. 
Keywords 
Chapter 11, bankruptcy, LaSalle, share price reactions. 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 3 1999 the Supreme Court made an unexpected 
judgement in the case of the Bank of America v. 203 
North LaSalle Partnership. The Supreme Court granted 
permission for a deviation to the “absolute priority 
rule”(APR)1 with respect to the old equity holders who in 
exchange for a sufficient value contribution could retain 
their equity after the firm emerges from Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. However, only on the condition that a 
“market test” would be conducted. Deviations from the 
APR in favor of equity holders was not a rare occurrence, 
however the condition concerning a “market test” was 
unexpected. It implied that equity holders could lose their 
equity by means of an auction or a competing plan. 
To my knowledge, only Giambona, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Matta (2014) examined the market performance around 
the Supreme Court Ruling. They expected to find that the 
“market test” would increase funding availability due to 
the increased asset verifiability. The hypotheses was 
supported by their findings as a significant positive 
cumulative average abnormal return of 1.62% was found 
five days surrounding the judgement.  
My research contributes to previous economic literature 
by examining the impact of the “market test” for the “new 
value contribution” on share price reactions. Instead of 
conducting one event study, like Giambona et al, I 
                                                          
1 The APR entails that no junior claimant will be paid before all senior 
classes are paid in full. 
conducted an event study for each Chapter 11 filing and 
compared the market reactions for the period before and 
after the judgement in LaSalle. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Guy (2012) plead that the judgement of the Supreme 
Court in LaSalle made debtors reluctant to file for 
Chapter 11. He argued that the “market test” makes 
retaining a stake in the firm uncertain and therefore risky, 
because the shareholders could lose their equity in an 
auction. Moreover, successfully restructuring outside 
Chapter 11 is more difficult due to the fact that the threat 
of filing for Chapter 11 is less credible. Therefore, the 
equity holders prefer to walk away and sell their assets 
rather than running a risk (Guy, 2012). The requirements 
imposed on the “new value contribution” makes Chapter 
11 even less attractive for small and medium sized firms, 
since it is not likely that their shareholders own valuable 
assets equal to the market value of their claim (Markell, 
2000).  
Hence, I expect that the foresight of a “market test” 
causes self-selection, which means that firms only file for 
Chapter 11 when they expect their chances of emerging 
and retaining (part of) the equity is high. Therefore, I 
expect to find relatively higher, but still negative, returns 
for firms that filed for Chapter 11 after the judgement 
compared to those who filed before the judgement. 
Furthermore, small and medium sized firms would rather 
go for a sale or an out of court solution than file for 
Chapter 11 as the risk of losing the equity will probably 
be higher for these firms. Thus, I also expect to find that 
the firms filing for bankruptcy after the judgement will be 
larger in size. 
DATA 
This study analysed bankruptcies of businesses covered 
by the US legislation. The UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy 
Research Database (BRD) was used to collect Chapter 11 
bankruptcy events and the Compustat database was used 
to collect accounting and stock data. Additionally, the 
Equal-Weighted Returns (including distributions) were 
retrieved from CRSP Stock Market Indexes, and the 
Fama and French (1993) factors were retrieved from 
Fama-French Portfolios and Factors. 
 
Sample selection 
This research focussed on the event of bankruptcy. Panel 
data from Chapter 11 cases were collected and divided 
into two samples. The first sample covered the period 
January 1990 up to May 2 1999 and the second sample 
covered May 3 1999 up to 2013. The judgement in 
LaSalle was unexpected and it is therefore assumed that 
the daily stock returns in sample 1 do not reflect this 
judgement.  
Financial firms were excluded from the samples, due to 
the fact that they are treated differently under the US 
bankruptcy legislation2. 
An event study was conducted for each Chapter 11 filing 
in the sample. Prior research on bankruptcies used 
announcement windows equal to [-1,+1] trading days, 
because firms can file for bankruptcy after the market 
closes (Dawkins, Bhattacharya & Bamber, 2007). 
Therefore, investors cannot always immediately react on 
bankruptcy news. In this study an announcement window 
of [-1,1] trading days was also applied. The event window 
was set to one month or 21 trading days. The reason 
behind the chosen width of this event window was so that 
it would not include more than one event as some firms 
file for bankruptcy more than once.  
Furthermore, to minimize the cross sample correlation the 
method used by Cox and Peterson (1994) was applied3. 
Additionally, only the first filing was included per 
sample. This means that a firm can only appear once in 
each of the two samples, but can appear twice in the total 
sample. The total sample consisted of 310 events, 
including 92 events before and 218 events after the 
LaSalle case.  
METHODOLOGY 
First the daily returns were calculated for every firm 
starting with 20 trading days before the bankruptcy date. 
The following formula was used: 
     (1) 
After calculating the returns, the returns were adjusted for 
the stock market returns. Instead of using normal returns 
calculated with, for example, CAPM the returns were 
adjusted for the daily Equal-Weighted Returns (EWRET). 
EWRET (Rm) was used because the company betas 
change before bankruptcy (Coelho & Taffler, 2008). 
Dawkins, Bhattacharya and Bamber (2007) pointed out 
that firms that file for bankruptcy generally have a lower 
median assets value and therefore the Equal-Weighted 
Returns should be used instead of the Value-Weighted 
Returns from the market index. These adjustments were 
incorporated in Formula 2. 
      (2) 
                                                          
2 Financial firms were classified as firms with a Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code between 6000 and 6999. 
3 This method entails keeping only the first observation, after sorting on 
trading day and firm names, when more than one event takes place on a 
specific trading day. 
After calculating every AR, the CARs were calculated 
using the standard event study method. 
       (3) 
The average of the CARs was used to obtain the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). In line with 
earlier bankruptcy studies, the CAARs were tested for 
significance using a parametric t-test and a nonparametric 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Rose-Green & Dawkins, 2002). 
Additionally, a regression was conducted to assess the 
effect of the “market test” on the cumulative abnormal 
return from companies who filed for Chapter 11. The 
following model was used:  
(4) 
MarketTest = dummy variable for fiscal year. Where 0 
represents 1990 – 2 May 1999 and 1 represents 3 May 
1999- 2013 
Zscore = Z-score measured for the fiscal year end before 
the bankruptcy filing 
Bookleverage = total debt divided by the book value of 
total assets  
MVEQ = market value of the equity for the fiscal year 
end before the bankruptcy filing 
SMB = small minus big 
HML = high minus low 
UMD = up minus down 
Industry = six dummy variables for the major divisions 
from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Yeari = fixed effect for time, where i starts at 1989 and 
goes up to 2013 
RESULTS 
Univariate analysis 
To provide a general overview of the market reactions to 
Chapter 11 filings in the periods 1990 until May 2 1999 
and May 3 1999 until 2013, the evolution of the CAARs 
are presented in Figure 1. The CAARs are the cross 
sectional average of the CARs per day in the event 
window. Figure 1 shows negative CAARs for the period 
before as well as after the judgement in LaSalle. This 
finding is supported by previous bankruptcy studies who 
also found negative CARs before the Chapter 11 filings. 
Furthermore, Figure 1 indicates a relative larger decline 
in CAARs for the period after LaSalle. This decline is 
especially visible on the day of filing (day zero) as the 
CAAR on the filing day covering the period before 
LaSalle equals -0.6198 (-61.98%) and after LaSalle 
equals -0.9143 (-91.43%). 
Figure 1 
The second analysis addressed the question whether the 
CAARs differed significantly from each other. First of 
all, the CAARs across the event window were tested with 
a t-test on their significance. Afterwards the CAARs were 
compared and checked on their significance by 
conducting another t-test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
The results of this analysis are presented in the Appendix. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Contrary to my expectations, the results in Table 1 show 
that the firms who filed for Chapter 11 after the 
judgement have a more negative CAAR than the ones 
before LaSalle. Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test pointed out that the CAARs differed 
significantly, with a difference equal to 0.085. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that firms who file for 
bankruptcy after the judgement tried to avoid bankruptcy, 
but still ended up filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. It is 
likely that these firms entered bankruptcy in a worse 
condition. Entering Chapter 11 in this condition will 
negatively influence the expected chance of emerging 
from Chapter 11 and thus increase the chances of losing 
the equity. This results in a relatively larger price drop as 
shareholders try to sell their shares. Bharath et al (2013) 
had a similar line of thought, which corresponded with 
my explanation. They proved that the increased power of 
creditors resulted in managers trying to avoid Chapter 11 
for as long as possible as they anticipated their reduced 
bargaining power.  
The final analysis, a descriptive analysis, was conducted 
to examine if the companies that filed for Chapter 11 after 
LaSalle were indeed in a worse condition. The results are 
displayed in Table 2 in the Appendix. Both samples had 
Z-score below 1.81, which shows that they were bankrupt 
(Altman, 1968). The significantly lower Z-score, 
calculated for the end of the fiscal year prior to the filing, 
supports the expectation that firms after LaSalle were in a 
worse condition. The firms filing for Chapter 11 after 
LaSalle also had a significant higher Bookleverage, 
which indicates that the proportion debt to assets was 
higher. The market value of the equity (MVEQ) is 
presented to examine whether the sizes of the firms 
differed between the two sample periods. The results in 
Table 4 show that the MVEQ was higher at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to the filing for the sample that filed after 
LaSalle, however this difference was not significant. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Multivariate analysis 
The goal of the multivariate analysis was to quantify the 
effect of the “market test” and it was conducted by means 
of four regressions. The results of these regressions are 
presented in the Appendix Table 3. The first regression 
analysis only controls for the following variables: Zscore, 
Bookleverage and HML, SMB and UMD. In addition to 
these factors the second regression also controls for time 
effects. The third regression controls for industry effects 
and the fourth regression controls for time and the 
industry effect. 
[Insert Table 3] 
First the results with respect to the main variable of 
interest MarketTest are discussed. In regression 1 a 
significant, at an alpha of five percent, coefficient of -0.1 
was found for the MarketTest variable. This means that 
companies that filed after LaSalle compared to the ones 
who filed before LaSalle had, on average, a 10% lower 
CAR in the month prior to the Chapter 11 filing. In short, 
regression 1 indicates that the market reacted stronger in 
the period after the judgement in LaSalle.   
The coefficient on MarketTest remained negative in 
regression 2, 3, and 4. But, in regression 2, controlled for 
time fixed effect, and in regression 4, controlled for 
industry and time fixed effect, the coefficients on 
MarketTest were not statistically significant. Thus, 
controlling for time fixed effects impacts the statistically 
significance of the coefficient on MarketTest, because 
regression 3, where only industry effects control variables 
were added, shows that the coefficient on MarketTest was 
equal to -0.097 (-9.7%) and still significant at an alpha of 
five percent. 
These results could be interpreted in multiple ways. First 
of all, it could mean that the judgement in LaSalle had no 
effect on share price reactions. This implies that the 
foresight of a “market test” does not cause investors to 
react stronger to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. A second 
interpretation, which contradicts the first interpretation, is 
that the “market test” did influence share price reactions, 
but that the inclusion of the fixed effects with respect to 
time in the model was incorrect. McKinnish (2000) found 
that fixed effect models on panel data possibly 
underestimate the effect of the variable of interest. 
Finally, the lack of significance could be caused due to 
the asset price channel possibly not reflecting the effects 
of the imposed “market test”. Bharath et al (2013) argued 
that the frequency of “absolute priority deviations” (APD) 
reduced drastically, and as a result, they found it unlikely 
that the expectation of APD was reflected in asset prices.  
The last interpretation seems to be the most likely and 
could be an explanation for the fact that the regression 
models, presented in the Appendix Table 3, have relative 
low explanatory power (low R-square). 
The control variables were also analysed. A significant 
negative coefficient for Zscore was found in all of the 
four regressions. This finding was supported by Rose-
Green and Dawkins (2002) who also found a significant 
negative Zscore. A negative coefficient for the Z-score 
was unexpected as it implies that firms who had a better 
financial position, and therefore a higher Z-score, 
experienced a larger price decline. A negative coefficient 
on Zscore might hint that investors were more surprised 
of the bankruptcy filings from companies with a better Z-
score. The coefficient from the natural log of the MVEQ 
variable was negative, but the coefficients were only 
significant in regression 1 and 2. The other control 
variables were not significant and therefore have no extra 
explanatory value. 
CONCLUSION 
This research investigated the impact of the judgement in 
LaSalle on share price reactions. The hypothesis of this 
study was that the “market test” caused self-selection, 
which meant that the companies who filed for Chapter 11 
estimated their chance of emerging high. Thus, the 
returns for companies who filed after LaSalle were 
expected to be higher, but still negative, compared to 
those who filed before LaSalle.  
To test the hypothesis an univariate and multivariate 
analysis was conducted. In the univariate analysis the 
CAARs and the sample characteristics were compared for 
the period before and after the judgement. The univariate 
analysis showed results contradicting the hypothesis. The 
CAAR was lower after the LaSalle case. A possible 
explanation for this result was that firms tried to avoid 
bankruptcy, but still ended up in Chapter 11. The 
descriptive analyses confirmed that the firms who filed 
after LaSalle were in a poorer financial condition. Also, 
the size of the firms was not significantly different before 
and after LaSalle. 
The multivariate analysis showed a negative effect of 
“market test” equal to 9.7%, when controlled for industry 
effect. However, when controlling for fixed effects, with 
respect to time, the effect of the “market test” was not 
significant. This could be interpreted in several ways. 
But, the most likely explanation is suggested by Bharath 
et al (2013) who argued that the asset prices are unlikely 
to reflect the expectation of the “absolute priority 
deviation”, because the frequency of these events have 
rapidly declined. Thus, future research on the effect of 
“absolute priority deviations” should focus on other more 
direct channels rather than asset pricing.  
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